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Abstract: Women-centred social movements are currently undergoing a period 
of intense self-reflection and -criticism following the election of Donald J. Trump 
as President, and in the context of the large degree of support he received 
from white women. This paper analyses the event of the ‘women’s marches’ 
that took place globally the day following Trump’s presidential inauguration 
for its significance for the present and future of feminism. The consequence 
of the marches has been debated both by participants and non-participants, 
due to the broad range of issues, interests, and demands present at the events. 
While there was a diversity of participants in the marches, a common criticism 
from non-participants was that the march was insufficiently political in its goals 
and manifestation, too novice and too disparate to constitute real political 
action. This paper responds to this concern and its implications by staging an 
exchange between Hannah Arendt and Jacques Rancière, in order to clarify the 
possibilities of movements such as the marches for the future of feminism.
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The place for the working out of difference is not the “self” or the 
culture of a group. It is the topos of an argument. And the place 
for such an argument is an interval. The place of a political subject 
is an interval or a gap: being together to the extent that we are in 
between—between names, identities, cultures and so on.1
Feminism is arguably experiencing something of a renewal currently, just as—
and perhaps even because—this historical moment is also so dark for women. 
For, if feminism is once again becoming mainstream acceptable, this event has 
been accompanied (even galvanised) by an aggressive resurgence of patriarchal 
control over women’s reproductive and economic lives, as well as an alarming 
insouciance regarding the patent sexism of elite political figures. Donald J. 
Trump was seemingly assured of electoral defeat after a recorded conversation 
revealed his casual attitude towards (and participation in) sexual assault of 
women who cross his path.2 Yet Republican voters held their noses and voted 
him into the White House anyway, so that the heralded inevitability of a first 
woman president did not come to pass. Weeks after Trump’s inauguration, 
the state of Arkansas passed a law that will allow rapists to sue doctors who 
abort the issue of their crime, and even to prevent a termination from taking 
place.3 At the time of writing, it has been reported that President Trump’s office 
is preparing an executive order declaring “that premarital sex is wrong, that 
marriage ‘is or should be recognised’ as between a man and a woman, that life 
begins at conception and that the words ‘male and female’ refer to ‘immutable 
biological sex’ assigned at birth.”4 In the meantime, Trump has been attempting 
to push through radical orders to stop immigration from predominantly Muslim 
nations, and has openly been engaged in an attempt to suppress voting rights 
of African Americans under the guise of tackling voter fraud. Before the election 
Trump had encouraged supporters to police predominantly black and Latinx 
polling districts against voter fraud (that is, to engage in voter intimidation). It 
is not only the rights of women that are under attack, therefore. Rather, anyone 
who is not male, white, and arguably also wealthy, stands to lose through the 
Trump administration’s agenda.
 It is, in this context, revealing that 53% of white women voters elected 
Trump.5 When choosing which aspects of their experience and which elements 
of their identities mattered most when casting a vote, more than half of white 
women found themselves indifferent to Trump’s insults against women, as well 
as his running mate Mike Pence’s staunchly anti-reproductive rights agenda. 
Moreover, not only did their being-woman not matter in this context, but women 
who voted for Trump also chose not to relate to the non-white and non-Christian 
women and men with most reason to fear what America would become under 
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Trump’s foreshadowed policies. In essence, these women chose to embrace 
their whiteness at the ballot box, revealing the extent to which—at least in their 
own minds—race trumps (so to speak) gender in the contemporary ledger of 
privilege. This cleavage between white and non-white women betrayed the 
urgency of other dimensions of systemic injustice: where some women fail so 
spectacularly to enact solidarity with women under attack on multiple strata, 
‘womanhood’ cannot be seen to unify women under one identity. As black 
feminists such as Patricia Hill-Collins, Audre Lorde, Aileen Moreton-Robinson, 
and bell hooks have argued well, liberation for white women has been bought at 
the expense of their non-white sisters.6 
 Is it not curious, then, that the first and most vivid demonstration of 
resistance against Trump’s presidency came in the form of a “women’s march”? 
On the day after the inauguration the “women’s march” attracted around 
500,000 women to Washington, and hundreds of thousands of women across 
the U.S. and the world, to protest against the vision of politics promoted by 
his presidency. Some commentators have sneeringly disparaged the march as 
apolitical, as disparate to the extent that there was no clear objective and no 
sense of a precise outcome for the action, and as attractive only to non-activists 
without commitment to ongoing protest. As is beginning to be documented, 
the genesis of that event itself reflected a degree of inexperience and naivety 
regarding organising a movement, and the privilege of white feminists, as 
insensitivities regarding inclusion and activism had to be addressed and 
negotiated.7 A controversy of the march involved the presence there of signage 
declaring the fact that “white women voted for Trump,” as many white marchers 
were confused and affronted by this acknowledgement, which placed them in 
the ambivalent situation of being implicated in Trump’s victory by dint of their 
skin colour and the privilege it affords. 
 Yet eclectic and at times divided as it was, the success of that action was 
largely due to its inclusiveness: of men, but also of women from an array of 
backgrounds and orientations to feminism. The march I attended in Sydney was 
addressed by a Muslim human rights lawyer and refugee (Mariam Veiszadeh), 
a white media commentator (Jane Caro), a young Queer activist, and twice 
by Aboriginal elder Jenny Munro, who rousingly called for a treaty with First 
Nations people who had never ceded sovereignty over the land that provided 
the topos for our demonstration.8 These inclusions signalled that something had 
been learned, as the theme of intersectionality was foregrounded even as we 
were told the “F” word wasn’t to be mentioned.9 The banner under which this 
insurrection gathered was, nonetheless, “women”; and there was a sense that 
through this diverse and perhaps “fractious” undertaking a new direction for 
feminism was belatedly fomenting as an inclusive movement. The challenge that 
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brought people together under this aegis of a feminism-that-dare-not-speak-its-
name also brought to light the limits of individualistic empowerment. The space 
of ‘feminism’ is being ‘occupied’ by those whom it had previously excluded, 
those whose status as ‘not counted’ had ensured a comfortable solidarity 
between white middle-class women.
 This paper aims to explore further this event of ‘feminism’ as including 
members whom it had previously not counted as such, through the thought 
of the French (male) political philosopher Jacques Rancière—and particularly 
through his encounter with Hannah Arendt, to whose book Men in Dark Times 
this essay makes titular reference. In that book, Arendt defines ‘darkness’ as 
the condition in which humanity finds itself wherein the political realm—the 
“space of appearance in which [men] [sic.] can show in deed and word… who 
they are and what they can do”10—has been eclipsed by what she calls ‘the 
social.’ The ‘dark times’ to which Arendt refers, then, do not signify the reign 
of totalitarianism as much as a conception of democracy that retreats into 
the administration of bodies rather than the public formulation of new world-
defining ideas and values. In his essay “Who Is the Subject of the Rights of 
Man?,” Rancière challenges Arendt’s demarcation of the political by drawing on 
the example of feminism as a new opening of politics that would be excluded 
as merely private according to Arendt’s formulation of the political.11 Rancière 
here in fact defines the political using the model of feminism, demonstrating not 
only feminism’s relevance but even its centrality to politics, precisely in virtue 
of its status of not belonging to a philosophical conception of ‘the political.’ In 
addressing the question of the future of feminism at a time when the model of 
feminism exemplified by Hillary Clinton would now seem painfully irrelevant, 
I would like to draw on Rancière’s redefinition of the political to theorise the 
current demands for inclusion of movements that have been marginalised by 
mainstream (liberal) feminism—and which promise, moreover, to revitalise 
feminism as a political movement.
I. Arendt’s Private/Public Distinction and Some Feminist Responses 
to her Thought
Hannah Arendt cuts a controversial figure within political philosophy, particularly 
among feminist readers of her work. A philosopher who worked as a journalist, 
and so expanded her reception well beyond the academy, Arendt is one of 
the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Her influence has been 
felt again in recent years in light of her emphasis on how we understand 
freedom and responsibility, and in the context of the rise again of racist political 
movements alongside a rapid global increase in numbers of displaced persons. 
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As a great woman thinker, however, Arendt was famously disparaging of 
feminism and women who “give orders.”12 Moreover, her critique of the modern 
liberal conception of freedom—and what she viewed as its perversion from 
Antiquity—led her to be especially critical of feminist attempts to reappraise 
the ‘private’ realm as political. This judgment is part of a much broader program 
for Arendt, who criticised modern philosophy’s retreat to the private sphere as 
the proper site of the free expression of individuality. According to Arendt, such 
retreat suggests a reversal of value from the situation of politics’ birthplace in 
ancient Greece. Importantly, Athenian activities within the private sphere or 
household (oikia) related to the “maintenance of life,” and so to necessity as 
opposed to freedom. 
To be free meant both not to be subject to the necessity of life or 
to the command of another and not to be in command oneself. It 
meant neither to rule nor to be ruled. Thus within the realm of the 
household, freedom did not exist, for the household head, its ruler, 
was considered to be free only in so far as he had the power to leave 
the household and enter the political realm, where all were equals.13
The maintenance of this structure in effect restricts political participation to 
household heads, or patriarchs. For Arendt, the crucial role the private realm—
as un-free—plays for the polis is as the place in which whatever should not be 
shown can remain hidden.14 That is to say, the household is a protective space, 
enabling the care of (men’s) bodies so that they may reveal themselves in the 
public (political) sphere as citizens. It is then, for Arendt, an abject space, or 
perhaps more precisely, a realm of indecency: privacy is required in order that 
the citizen may exercise control over what is seen and what is not seen; what 
comes under consideration of ‘his’ peers as an aspect of ‘his’ appearing and what 
remains hidden for the sake of decorum. That philosophers in modernity began 
to characterise the private sphere as a space of freedom (the free practice 
of religion, for instance) amounted to a category error for Arendt, effectively 
politicising what should remain apolitical, and crowding out the place of a 
genuine politics through which humanity would be allowed to come to fruition. 
The practice of religion and other ‘private’ concerns should be outside the 
purview of the state not because that would ensure their freedom, for Arendt. 
Rather, they should exist beyond the state’s limits simply because they are of no 
interest to it: they do not pertain to the realm of freedom (politics) at all. 
 Some of the conclusions Arendt draws from this commitment to the 
public sphere as the authentic space for the unfolding of freedom are decidedly 
unpalatable. Particularly, she dismisses the political assertions of women and 
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workers as corrosive of the human capacity for freedom, precisely because they 
bring into the political realm of appearances that which ought to remain hidden. 
For instance, she writes:
[F]rom the beginning of history to our own time [the private sphere] 
has always been the bodily part of human existence that needed to 
be hidden in privacy, all things connected with the necessity of the 
life process itself, which prior to the modern age comprehended all 
activities serving the subsistence of the individual and the survival of 
the species. Hidden away were the laborers who “with their bodies 
minister to the [bodily] needs of life,” and the women who with their 
bodies guarantee the physical survival of the species. Women and 
slaves belonged to the same category and were hidden away not 
only because they were somebody else’s property but because their 
life was “laborious,” devoted to bodily functions.15
Feminism’s creed that the ‘personal is political’ is thus not only misguided, from 
Arendt’s perspective: it is also distasteful, and moreover, undermines the very 
possibility of political action. It contaminates the political sphere by bringing 
darkness (understood as what ought to remain hidden) into a discursive field 
that would then take the place of politics.
 There have been noteworthy attempts to salvage Arendt’s philosophy 
to theorise feminist politics despite this antagonistic regard for feminism. For 
instance, Maria Markus has argued that Arendt’s account of figures such as Rahel 
Varnhagen and Rosa Luxemburg (as well as Franz Kafka, Heinrich Heine, and 
Walter Benjamin) as “pariah” allows Arendt to open to a possibility of feminism, 
or at least to the inclusion in the political sphere of outsiders. Arendt opposes 
the pariah to the “parvenu,” the latter being one who abjures his or her own 
outsider status in order to “pass” as one of the majority. The pariah, by contrast, 
is faithful to her or his uniqueness or rebel status. Markus writes, 
To be a rebel and to be isolated were two characteristics common 
to almost all ‘conscious pariah’ described by Arendt. Neither was 
chosen as such but occurred as a consequence of a much more 
basic choice of remaining what one was.16
A principal aspect of Arendt’s high estimation of Rosa Luxemburg is her 
insistence on remaining a Jew and a woman, notwithstanding the significant 
personal costs of refusing to downplay these elements of her being. In claiming 
the right to be who she was, Luxemburg thus disclosed her humanity to others 
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within the appropriate sphere of political action, in solidarity with other pariah—
others whose existence was difficult in that historical moment. The ‘being 
woman’ and ‘being Jew’ disclosed through this gesture does not, therefore, 
cling to the social or private aspects of being: they are, rather released from an 
‘obscene’ (or hidden) register of existence, transformed through this affirmation 
from being merely passive attributes. In such a context of rebellion, these 
otherwise ‘given’ states are elevated to ‘activity’ (properly belonging to freedom 
and politics). 
 I will return to the significance of pariah in relation to solidarity in the 
conclusion to this paper. Seyla Benhabib takes up a second and related aspect 
of Arendt’s philosophy that may be salvaged to theorise feminism. While critical 
of Arendt’s emphasis in much of her work on the concept of public space as 
a sphere that implicitly excludes women due to their historical relegation to 
the private sphere of necessity, Benhabib highlights a particular rendering of 
public space given by Arendt: that is, as ‘associational,’ wherein “men [sic] act 
together in concert” (as opposed to ‘agonistic,’ which is a competitive space for 
recognition and the display of greatness).17 Association is the aspect of public 
space through which otherwise excluded or isolated individuals come together 
in mutual struggle toward a common end, regardless of their differences. 
Through this gesture of solidarity, individuals emerge out of their privacy to 
appear in public in their relatedness to others, to exercise freedom together. 
Such appearances are ‘public’ in virtue of having enacted a space of freedom, 
rather than in virtue of having taken place in a particular institutional context 
or according to an already determined structure delimiting who gets to speak 
where. Arguably, then, this associational conception of publicity is at least not 
hostile to women’s (and labourers’) participation in the manner that agonistic 
publicity conceivably is. Benhabib locates the discussion of associational 
publicity as both a site of promise for feminist theory, and as a site of tension 
within Arendt’s own political theory, where certain of her exclusions of instances 
of activism from the public sphere are inattentive to their associational (and thus 
political) character. 
 I have discussed elsewhere Arendt’s significant blind spot regarding 
actions leading to the desegregation of Schools in Little Rock Arkansas—
actions that she had characterised as non-political, and even as endangering the 
political by imposing the social into the political sphere.18 Benhabib also notes 
the remarkable misjudgment in Arendt’s reading of “the demands of the Black 
parents, upheld by the US Supreme Court, to have their children admitted into 
previously all-white schools” as akin to “the desire of the social parvenu to gain 
recognition in a society that did not care to admit her.”19 In the first instance, 
Arendt fails to comprehend here the very real material implications of denial 
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of access to quality education, which does not amount to a mere desire for 
recognition. But secondly and more fundamentally, Benhabib suggests that 
Arendt’s difficulty in coming to terms with pivotal instances of political activism 
such as this is due to what she calls her “phenomenological essentialism,” 
meaning 
[Arendt’s] belief that each type of human activity has its proper 
‘place’ in the world, and that this place is the only authentic space in 
which this kind of activity can truly unfold.20
Benhabib argues that this rigidity is inconsistent with Arendt’s associative 
conception of freedom: a conception that provides a basis within her philosophy 
to theorise the kinds of feminist, worker, and civil rights movements she 
elsewhere explicitly disparages.
 We will now turn to Rancière’s critique of Arendt’s political theory, his own 
concerns centering similarly on what Benhabib calls her “phenomenological 
essentialism.” Rancière, however, introduces a rival conception of politics that 
further opens out possibilities for thinking the present and future of feminist 
action in the context of the women’s marches.
2. Rancière on What Is and Is Not Politics
Jacques Rancière is broadly critical of the tendency of political philosophy to 
delimit in advance the scope of political action, as if such a gesture were itself 
politically neutral. For, the effect of this tendency is to exclude or render invisible 
whatever assertion of equality or litigation of a wrong does not accord to the 
given account of ‘the political.’ If theory takes it upon itself preemptively to 
declare what is political and what is not, this can only reinforce existing social 
inequalities. Philosophers will miss the revolution if they look only in the places 
they preordain it should be found. But more than this, philosophy becomes a 
servant of the elite when it fails to recognise as political expressions it relegates 
to another, non-political (even non-human) sphere of life; when it attempts to 
orchestrate a peace (or consensus) as the first condition of political community; 
or when it attempts to circumscribe and control the ways in which a collective 
may legitimately claim equality. 
 There are three ways in which political philosophy characteristically 
attempts to restrict the field of politics, according to Rancière, each of which 
responds to particular historical instances of the “scandal” of a collective 
assertion of a fundamental equality, by displacing and neutralising real politics 
and producing its simulacrum in theory. The first anti-democratic tendency of 
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political philosophy, “archipolitics,” originates with Plato, who attempted to 
enact a “complete realization of the arkhê [origin, or first principle of order] of 
community, total awareness, replacing the democratic configuration of politics 
with nothing left over.”21 Rancière refers here to Plato’s overly prescriptive 
designation of all roles within the community (from philosopher-kings, to 
guardians, to artisans), according to a principle (arkhê ) supposedly inherent to 
the community. The context to which Plato reacts is the emergence of a new and 
threatening variety of democracy in Athens through the inclusion of the demos; 
the freed slave who previously had had no part in the civic life of the polis, and 
who presses his equality by speaking in the name—synecdoche like—of the 
freedom others had taken for granted. For Plato, by contrast, in his imaginary 
society the Republic, everyone knows his or her correct place, according to 
a hierarchy of ‘parts’ supposed to mirror the structure of the well-ordered 
soul (appetitive, spiritual, and deliberative). “With nothing left over” refers us 
to political philosophy’s trait of failing to see what its system refuses. What 
Rancière calls “the part with no part” is the remainder that Plato’s philosophy 
both proscribes and necessitates: a remainder that, for Rancière, in fact defines 
politics as a dispute in which two opposing worlds (rationalities or ontologies) 
come to exist in the same space: when the first excludes that other, and this 
exclusion is brought to issue through the demand of the excluded class. 
 By attempting to designate all parts “with nothing left over,” then, 
Plato and other archipolitical philosophers effectively suppress the political, 
understood by Rancière as this disruptive assertion of equality. The truth the 
archipolitical philosopher obscures is that the political community in reality has 
no arkhê; rather, the ‘first principle’ of community, in so far as we might use such 
a phrase, is politics.
In the form of democracy, politics is already in place, without waiting 
for its theoretical underpinnings or its arkhê, without waiting for 
the proper beginning that will give birth to it as performance of its 
own principle. The demos is already there without its three features: 
the erecting of a sphere for the name of the people to appear; the 
unequal count of this people that is both whole and part at the 
same time; the paradoxical revelation of the dispute by part of the 
community that identifies with the whole in the very name of the 
wrong that makes it the other party. This observation of the fact of 
antecedence is transformed by ‘political philosophy’ into a diagnosis 
of inherent vice.22
Democracy’s inherent vice is that anyone from any quarter might emerge to 
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demand equality, and the appeal to a first cause or origin (arkhê) serves to bring 
‘police’ (the appearance of order) back to the scene of politics. Notably, and 
perhaps surprisingly given her concern to theorise possibilities of resistance, 
Rancière views Arendt as falling into the category of archipolitical philosophy.23 
We will turn to Rancière’s critique of Arendt in this light shortly.
 The second anti-democratic tendency of political philosophy Rancière 
identifies is ‘parapolitics,’ which ostensibly emerges as a rejoinder to 
archipolitics. This approach, exemplified and “invented” by Aristotle, converts the 
“theoretical paradox” of politics (as a “meeting of incommensurables”) and casts 
it as a “practical paradox of government”: that is, equality is a problem for which 
practical remedies are sought through a theorisation of political legitimacy.24 
While Plato excludes altogether the demos (or part that has no part) from his 
conception of the well-ordered city, Aristotle coopts the demos, according 
to Rancière, thus domesticating politics, or policing the dispute that defines 
politics. Aristotle achieves this policing most effectively through the regulation 
of what counts as “speech” (logos) and what is merely “voice” (phônê)—the 
latter being shared in common with non-human animals, where the former is 
uniquely human. While speech is language—ordered rationally and belonging 
to an ethical register that expresses the difference between right and wrong, 
good and evil—voice is disordered and can only register pleasure and pain. The 
distinction is nominally supposed only to designate a difference between human 
and non-human animals, yet also produces a hierarchical separation within 
humanity, according to different classes’ purported degree of participation 
in rationality or logos. In The Politics, Aristotle distinguishes those with the 
nature of slaves from those suited to rule in precisely this way.25 In modernity, 
parapolitics is found in social contract theories (most paradigmatically in 
Hobbes) that attempt to locate the origin of politics as a variety of consensus, 
wherein citizens choose to limit their freedoms and even their equality in order 
to secure peace. Politics is thereby defined in terms of power and questions 
of legitimate force rather than equality. Politics as understood by Rancière as 
dissensus is ushered to the margins of the polis, as disorder and inherent danger: 
the “madness in the multitude,” or threat of sedition, against which philosophy 
must regulate.26
 The third variety of political theory Rancière suggests neutralises genuine 
politics is metapolitics, exemplified by Marx. While Rancière is perhaps most 
sympathetic with Marxism—to the extent that it is an emancipatory and 
revolutionary politics based on conceptions of universal equality—Marxist 
philosophy nevertheless obscures politics by differentiating between authentic 
and so-called inauthentic forms of political action, with the claim that it can 
divine an underlying truth of politics in the social as class struggle. This gesture 
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then enables the Marxist to deem as illegitimate the false consciousness of those 
whose actions it fails to recognise as political. As Rancière puts this,
Metapolitics can seize on any phenomenon as a demonstration 
of the truth of its falseness. For the truth of falseness, Marx in his 
genius invented a key word that all modernity has adopted, at times 
even turning it against him. He called it ideology. Ideology is not 
just a new word for simulacrum or illusion. Ideology is the word 
that signals the completely new status of the true that metapolitics 
forges: the true as the truth of the false. … It alternately allows the 
political appearance of the people to be reduced to the level of an 
illusion concealing the reality of conflict or, conversely, the names of 
the people and the manifestations of its dispute to be put down as 
outdated, holding up the emergence of common interests. Ideology 
is the term that links the production of politics to its evacuation, that 
designates the distance between words and things as the falseness 
in politics that can always be turned into the falseness of politics.27
Whereas from Marx’s metapolitical perspective this gap between truth and 
consciousness (or words and things… or man and citizen) is the problem or 
“scandal” of politics, for Rancière this internal division—or ‘dissensus’—is the 
site at which politics might emerge: that is, precisely where nothing (political) is 
expected to be. For Rancière, “[t]here is politics from the moment there exists 
the sphere of appearance of a subject, the people, whose particular attribute is 
to be different from itself, internally divided.”28 The part that has no part, that 
does not quite coincide with itself or what it is supposed to be, is the subject 
of politics in this regard. And in so far as metapolitics designates this non-
coincident subject as a false consciousness, it not only misses but even abjures 
the political moment.
 We might note here that this metapolitical position is represented by 
objections that the women’s marches’ purpose was not clearly articulated 
or unified. The judgment behind this criticism is that the marchers were not 
sufficiently conscious of what brought them together, and that their actions 
did not adequately reveal or materialise an underlying social truth. Rancière’s 
critique of identity politics and his account of subjectivisation help to elucidate 
the political that such a deployment of metapolitics misses, particularly where 
‘consciousness’ becomes a marker of one’s being as political. Identity politics 
has predominated feminist movements since the late 1960s, to the extent that 
a common experience of oppression shared by all women within patriarchy, 
and in virtue of their womanhood, has been seen to form a conceptual ground 
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for feminism. There has been much critique of this invocation of a common 
experience of oppression, particularly on the part of black and lesbian feminists 
for whom womanhood is neither the limit nor even the predominant determinant 
of their oppression. The numerous differences between women’s experiences 
together with the failure of white and middle class women to take up other 
causes (such as the deaths of black men at the hands of police) historically have 
produced hierarchies within feminism, and have alienated many women from 
the movement. Audre Lorde illustrates the tensions brought out through identity 
feminism well in an essay published in 1984,
Poor women and women of Color know there is a difference 
between the daily manifestations of marital slavery and prostitution 
because it is our daughters who line 42nd Street. If white american 
feminist theory need not deal with the differences between us, and 
the resulting difference in our oppressions, then how do you deal 
with the fact that the women who clean your houses and tend your 
children while you attend conferences on feminist theory are, for the 
most part, poor women and women of Color?29
This gesture toward the need for intersectionality implicitly criticises the identity 
politics notion that all women experience oppression in more or less the same 
way. Those whose primary understanding of disadvantage is restricted to their 
being a woman under patriarchy most likely have not been discriminated against 
in virtue of being black, poor, disabled, or queer. The extent to which a woman is 
able to claim that sexism is the most fundamental form of oppression may also 
be an index of her relative privilege. And conversely, if a slim majority of white 
women voted for Trump, then it would seem that the most privileged women do 
not feel sexist oppression to be especially fundamental in any case.
 Where the most privileged women abandon feminism the identification 
as “woman” perhaps loses its political currency. Rancière interprets the focus 
on ‘identity’ in terms of political philosophy’s tendency to depoliticise whatever 
does not fit its account (or counting) of the political, and so arguably we may 
take lessons on the depoliticisation of feminism from this critical perspective. 
Particularly, for Rancière identity politics accedes to the archipolitical 
assignment of roles according to social hierarchy. By these lights it is not merely 
accidental that hierarchies and exclusions take place within the context of a 
feminism conceptualised according to identity politics. Just as Audre Lorde 
experienced her inclusion in the conference to which she addressed “The 
Master’s House” as tokenistic, “fixing” feminism cannot only be a matter of 
inviting more women of non-white, non-affluent backgrounds into community. 
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Although this may be a beginning, hierarchy is inherent to the logic of identity 
politics feminism in so far as it operates as an archipolitical discourse. In so far 
as feminism operates metapolitically it is again characterised by hierarchy—
between a vanguard of knowers and the dupes whom they must lead to 
liberation, for instance.30 Finally, in its parapolitical register, feminist politics may 
silence certain speech as apolitical or beneath political concern: for instance, by 
excluding the accounts of self provided by sex workers or trans women.31 Beyond 
a threshold of inclusion (say 30%) there may be real change, but this would 
be due to a consequent disruption of the fundamental logic of the community 
rather than the scope of an identity category simply having been expanded. The 
rationale will have shifted from identities, roles, and hierarchies of oppression, to 
a fundamental equality between diverse parts. 
 In this context, for Rancière de-identification becomes a political strategy 
where the subject finds itself in the gap between identities or imperatives: 
that is, precisely where it is ‘un-conscious,’ or cannot yet articulate the specific 
nature of its belonging to a group because that nature is still in the process of 
materialising. Politics for Rancière takes place through the manifestation of an 
equality, rather than in advance of that action. Subjective de-identification, then, 
expresses its equality through its equal capacity for (political) speech, which 
must be demonstrated rather than already authorised. Accordingly, we may see 
the lack of discernable unified purpose that was charged toward the women’s 
marches as the very factor that engendered their political force: as the topos 
of a “subjectivization in an argumentative plot.”32 As an equivocation between 
identities, or a failure to coincide with a putatively essential phenomenological 
experience, the subject of politics emerges precisely where it is not expected, 
to claim an equality it does not yet own. If the women’s marches promise to 
refashion feminism, it is because of their lack of cohesion. They were visible—
even spectacular—because of their diversity; because they brought together 
women in argument (or dissensus) with one another as well as with Trump.
 We will return to reflect on the political import of the women’s marches in 
the conclusion. Let’s turn now to Rancière’s critique of Arendt, whose misreading 
of politics further elucidates feminism’s importance for politics more broadly, as 
the emergence of the part with no part.
3. Rancière’s Critique of Arendt
Although he addresses the limitations of Arendt’s account of politics throughout 
his writings, Rancière’s most focused critique appears in ‘Who Is the Subject of 
the Rights of Man?’ Here he argues his characterisation of her as an archipolitical 
thinker in relation to her account of the apparent aporia opened by the situation 
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of displaced—or stateless—persons in Europe. Appropriately for our purposes, 
Rancière draws on the eighteenth century feminist figure Olympe de Gouges, as 
exemplar of the political moment that Arendt would exclude, in order to flesh 
out his critique of her philosophy. Feminism’s cri de coeur that ‘the personal 
is political’ can be seen as disruptive of ‘police,’ or the order that archipolitics 
attributes to the community, in so far as it insists that what conventionally 
belongs to privacy (and so should remain hidden) is the most pressing issue 
for public attention. As we saw in section one, Arendt’s noted distaste for 
feminism may be attributed to her sense that the distinction between “public” 
and “private” spheres ought to be maintained, and that its collapse signals a 
depravation of politics understood as freedom.
 The aporia opened by the existence refugees, according to Arendt, 
bears upon the status of human rights supposed to belong to all by virtue of 
their humanity, but which, in practice, accrue only to citizens in virtue of their 
protection by a state or national community. In The Origins of Totalitarianism 
Arendt argues that displaced persons give the lie to human rights to the extent 
that they are shown to have no purchase on the obligations of others. The rights 
that are said to be theirs because they are human are withheld in so far as they 
have no national community to legislate and enforce those rights. As Rancière 
summarises her position,
Arendt found [in the figure of the refugee] the “body” fitting the 
abstractedness of the rights and she stated the paradox as follows: 
the Rights of Man are the rights of those who are only human beings, 
who have no more property left than the property of being human. 
Put another way, they are the rights of those who have no rights, the 
mere derision of right.33
Rancière picks up a note of disgust in Arendt’s apprehension of the refugee, 
as one who is deprived of a public and at the mercy of their “givenness” or 
necessity—that is, who is purely private. This disgust is most patent, according 
to Rancière, where Arendt writes: “Their plight is not that they are not equal 
before the law, but that no law exists for them; not that they are oppressed, but 
that nobody wants to oppress them.”34 This “contemptuous tone” towards those 
whom, Arendt suggests, “were guilty of not even being able to be oppressed, 
not even worthy of being oppressed,”35 Rancière attributes to Arendt’s 
constitution as an archipolitical philosopher, upon encountering the quotient of 
humanity that does not fit her schema: or in Rancière’s language, “the part that 
has no part.” 
 As Rancière demonstrates, Arendt’s aporetic construction of the refugee 
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assumes that a place must already have been made for them within the 
community before they may be afforded respect as persons capable of political 
action (rather than merely nutritive behaviors). Arendt presents the refugee 
as a kind of reductio ad absurdum to human rights, and specifically the notion 
that a politically recognisable human could exist in an abstract sense, external 
to the community that provides the occasion for political action. While, to be 
fair, Arendt’s characterisation of the public sphere brings insight to the kind of 
intersubjectivity that supports action, her account leaves those whom the state 
does not recognise in a condition of abandonment. In extremis, her philosophy 
verges into the messianic drifts of a Giorgio Agamben, for whom all are 
abandoned impassively to await the call of a radically heterodox (miraculous) 
rupture to the order from without. Rancière’s solution to Arendt’s quandary 
constitutes a reversal of her formulation that would place agency in the hands 
of the part with no part, the unaccounted for. He rewrites her paradoxical 
construction that human rights are “the rights of those who have no rights,” as 
the equally paradoxical: 
the Rights of Man are the rights of those who have not the rights 
that they have and have the rights that they have not.36
We may understand this sentence in terms of our earlier discussion of de-
identification, as an emergence of the political in the interstices of identities 
and positions. De-identification, and the process of subjectivisation that attends 
it, takes place where the emergent subject rejects the role given to it as right-
less, or as outside the bounds of community: in other words, as uncounted. 
The “rights of man,” in this light, are not the scraps that remain after the citizen 
has taken his portion (and therefore worthless, as Arendt would have it), just 
as it is not simply a matter of the citizen offering the rightless a place at the 
table. Rather, Rancière’s formulation outlines how the uncounted demands to 
be counted, thus demonstrating their right to a place at the table. In enacting 
this formula, the “part with no part” demonstrates that the paradox belongs 
to the community, by refusing to play the part of paradox themselves. They 
demonstrate that a right to appear as political cannot be portioned out in 
advance, and so reject their role outside the sphere of politics. Yet, at stake here 
is not only the inclusion of the rightless, but moreover, the disordering of the 
community. For by demanding the rights they have not been given, the part with 
no part exercises a right the social order intends they should not have—indeed, 
the deprivation of which ensures social order (or police). The having of a right is 
thereby performative, and through the demonstration of an equality one is not 
supposed to own, one emerges as a subject of right. In the case of the stateless, 
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the insistence that ‘I am human’—that is, the claim to an identity that all others 
take for granted, and so is barely an identity at all (as with the claim to freedom 
of the demos)—reconfigures the apportionment of rights and privileges, because 
it shows that apportionment to be without an intrinsic principle, ground, or 
arkhê.
 While the refugee is the archetypal ‘part with no part’ for Arendt, 
where Rancière elaborates his own conception of politics at the border of the 
community, he takes as his exemplar Olympe de Gouges. A revolutionary and 
feminist during the French Revolution, de Gouges took up with the fraternité 
that would exclude her the question of why a woman, if she is “entitled to go to 
the scaffold,” should not also be “entitled to go to the assembly.”37 By holding 
the revolutionaries to the very ideals through which they claimed to found a 
new political community—that all are born equal—de Gouges demonstrated at 
once her equality to them as a woman, and the fact that their own conception of 
social order was based upon a miscount (i.e., that it could not include women). 
Moreover, gesturing back again to Arendt, Rancière shows that this miscount 
upon which the community is founded is precisely the division between ‘private’ 
and ‘public’ spheres that Arendt defends so tenaciously.
[Women] allegedly belonged to private, domestic life. And the 
common good of the community had to be kept apart from the 
activities, feelings, and interests of private life. Olympe de Gouges’s 
argumentation precisely showed that the border separating bare 
life and political life could not be so clearly drawn. There was at 
least one point where “bare life” proved to be “political”: there 
were women sentenced to death, as enemies of the revolution. If 
they could lose their “bare life” out of a public judgment based 
on political reasons, this meant that even their bare life—their life 
doomed to death—was political. If, under the guillotine, they were 
as equal, so to speak, “as men,” they had the right to the whole of 
equality, including equal participation in political life.38
At stake for politics is precisely this border between the lives that are counted 
and those that are not. And the political subject is, for Rancière, this “capacity 
for staging … scenes of dissensus” such as de Gouges’s challenge to her equals: 
if you would kill me because my existence matters politically, then why not also 
let me vote?39
 It is significant that for Rancière a woman exemplifies this process of 
subjectivisation: of the negotiation of the gap between ‘man’ (bare life) and 
‘citizen’ (political life). Thoughout the history of western thought, women have 
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defined the boundary between ‘the political’ and what is excluded from it—
not only as the excluded remainder, but they have also been charged with the 
maintenance of that division. Women’s inclusion in political life continues to be 
felt as a scandal, and the propriety of the boundary between the domicile and 
public life is policed rigorously through the shaming of women who choose a 
public life (Julia Gillard, Hillary Clinton), the legislation of health care (particularly 
access to contraception and abortion), and the restriction of public funding to 
women’s shelters, domestic violence programs, and the family court. Standing 
at the boundary between public and private spheres (or political and bare life, 
or freedom and necessity), women are political par excellence, according to 
Rancière’s conception of the political as a capacity for disruption or dissensus 
through which the question of ‘what is political and what is not’ remains ever-
present.  
4. Conclusion and Détente
If ‘woman’ operates thus as the figure at the border of politics, then this goes 
some way to explaining why the women’s marches were able to serve to rally 
together such diverse subjectivities, as a symbol of resistance on the morning 
after Trump’s presidential inauguration. I would argue that the women’s march 
was ‘successful’—and precisely was not a throwback to a past era of feminism—
because it did not represent an instance of inclusion of diverse women by the 
grace of white, privileged women, and according to a conception of a shared 
experience of womanhood as oppression under patriarchy. Rather, if we were 
instead to understand the women’s marches according to Rancière’s account 
of ‘woman’ at the border that determines politics, then the symbol of ‘woman’ 
would not necessarily represent an identity that bids interpellation (and 
subjection). Instead, ‘woman’ might stand in for a moment of de-identification: 
the subjective moment of each participant, between exclusion and inclusion, 
‘man’ and ‘citizen,’ personal and political. ‘Woman’ in this case would provide 
an image through which subjects of politics may stage a dissensus, disrupting 
the order of what may be seen (public) and what is supposed to remain hidden 
(private). The knitting and crocheting of “pussy hats” that became a global 
feature of the marches is one demonstration of this insistence that what was 
excluded from politics can also be central to it: this most paradigmatically 
feminine practice (which, incidentally, Freud likened to the fabrication of 
pudenda)40 became a political activity through this staging.
 Finally, and in a gesture of a détente with Arendt, we might also deploy 
the figure of the pariah to think through the specific mode of solidarity that 
the women’s marches enacted. In this light, we can further understand the 
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marches not as a collection of women identifying with a hegemonic experience 
of womanhood. Rather, with Arendt, we can comprehend solidarity as an act 
of fidelity to one’s difference, and even an elevation of the private and ‘hidden’ 
aspects of experience, to render them public and fashion with them one’s own 
freedom. This would also constitute what Rancière describes as a redistribution 
of the sensible, wherein at the site of the inauguration, “they put together the 
world where those rights are valid and the world where they are not. They put 
together a relation of inclusion and a relation of exclusion.”41
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